Lower levels of news use are generally understood to be associated with less political engagement among citizens. But while some people simply have a low preference for news, others avoid the news intentionally. So far little is known about the relationship between active news avoidance and civic engagement in society, a void this study has set out to fill. Based on a four-wave general population panel survey in the Netherlands, conducted between April and July 2020 (N = 1,084) during a (...) crisis situation, this research-in-brief investigates the development of news avoidance and pro-social civic engagement over time. Results suggest that higher news topic avoidance results in higher levels of civic engagement. The study discusses different explanations for why less news can mean more engagement. (shrink)

Misinformation perceptions related to global crises such as COVID-19 can have negative ramifications for democracy. Beliefs related to the prevalence of falsehoods may increase news avoidance or even vaccine hesitancy – a problematic context for successful interventions and policymaking. To explore how misinformation beliefs developed over a six-month pandemic period and how they corresponded to (digital) media preferences and selective exposure to the news, we rely on a five-wave panel survey conducted in the Netherlands (N =1,742). Our main findings show (...) that misinformation perceptions got more pronounced as the pandemic evolved. Social media use related to more pronounced misinformation beliefs within waves, whereas mainstream news use corresponded to less pronounced misinformation beliefs. An important implication for journalists and policymakers is to lower the over-time accumulation of misinformation perceptions, for example, by increasing transparency and acknowledging “honest mistakes.”. (shrink)

Populist attributions of blame have important effects on citizens’ attitudes, cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. Extending previous studies that have mostly looked at populist messages blaming political elites, we use an online survey experiment (N = 805) to investigate the effects of blaming different elitist actors in populist and non-populist ways: (1) political elites, (2) corporate elites, (3) scientific elites, and (4) a combination of these elites. We compare mere causal responsibility attribution to populist blame attributions that highlight a central opposition (...) between “pure ordinary people” and “corrupt elites” to tease out the specific effect of populist rhetoric. Results suggest that populist messages blaming all elites have stronger effects than isolated cues. Furthermore, populist blame attribution leads to more negative perceptions of the elites than non-populist blame attribution. The finding that populist frames can – under some conditions – activate negative perceptions toward different elites is alarming in times of declining trust in societal institutions, and calls for a more encompassing understanding of populists’ scapegoats. (shrink)

This study applies agenda setting theory to understand how firms’ financial performance is affected by both the news media and the public agenda. Using content and time-series analysis for the data of five Dutch firms, we demonstrate that media attention and public attention for a firm affect stock market ratings. As hypothesized, the effect of media attention was found to be negative whereas the effect of public attention was positive.